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A CASE IN Two ACTS IN SEARCH OF A MIDDLE GROUNDUnited States v. Charters-Imagine a man in the following
situation: He is walking down the street listening to a
cacophony of voices. They form a vague background to his
aimless wandering, but one in particular stands out. It
frightens him. It says that the President of the United States
is organizing a plot to kill him, and suggests--rather, insists-that he "get him first." His psychiatrist has assured him that
these voices are not real. Nonetheless, he forms a vague plan
to kill the President and inquires about purchasing a gun, "just
in case."
He gets arrested and the prison doctors want to inject
him with medication. He feels frightened, confused, and
angry. Are these psychiatrists part of the plot? What will the
medication do? He vaguely recalls that the last time he took
it his mouth got dry and his muscles stiffened; also, they said
that he was "doing much better" and discharged him from the
hospital. Really, it is not so bad here on the unit. He would
not mind staying. He decides not to take the medication.
What should the legal system do with him? Should it
treat him as a poor, lost soul in need of treatment he does
not realize he needs, or as a criminal willfully denying the
government of the chance to do the one thing that might
make him competent to stand trial for threatening the
President? Should he be seen as a powerless person in need
of protection of his right to think his own thoughts and do as
he pleases with his own body, or as a danger to an ordered
society? In reality, he would be all of the above, but who
should decide what is to be done with him and how? What
procedures would protect both him and the President?1
1. This account is based on the case which is the focus of this Comment: United States
v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) vacating 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
It is a fictionalized account based on the reported cases, some specific references in the lower
court hearing, and the writer's eight-years of experience providing mental health care to the
incarcerated mentally disabled.
Additionally, this account makes reference to medication, a repeated issue in the
Comment. The medication referred to are antipsychotics. The earliest of these was
chlorpromazine (Thorazine). It was found, by the French surgeon in Laborit, to be helpful
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Nowhere is this dilemma better illustrated than in United

States v. Charters, in which a panel of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals answered that nothing less than a two-stage
judicial hearing on the matter would satisfy the defendant's

due process rights.3 One year later, rehearing the case en
banc, the Fourth Circuit found such judicial hearings to be
unnecessary, saying the decision to medicate with antipsychotic
drugs is a medical one to be made by Charter's psychiatrists.4
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed these
questions,5 leaving the federal judiciary in a quandry.

in decreasing certain responses to surgical stress. Delay and Deniken, in 1952, experimented
with its effects on schizophrenia and news of its usefulness spread quickly. J. DAVIS, ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS, 3 COMPREHENSIVE TEXT BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY III 2557 (H. Kaplan, A.
Freedman & B. Sadock eds. 1988) [hereinafter DAVIS]. Today, there are a number of
compounds with similar effects: trifluoperazine (Stelazine), perphenazine (Trilafon),
fluphenazine (Proxilin), thiothexene (Navane), and haloperidol (Haldol). Crane, Two Decades
of Psychopharmacolog and Community Mental Health: Old and New Problems of the
Schizophrenic Patient, 36 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 744, 656 n.1 (1974).
The typical symptoms which are manifested by a schizophrenic patient, which the
medications are used to manage, include delusions, hallucinations, and disturbances in thought
and affect.
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 187 (3d rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. For
example, a person suffering from schizophrenia may be unable to "[d]istinguish categories and
maintain goal-directed thinking which affects the communicative and social functions of the
patient. Consensus about the relationship of person and events (which characterizes what is
stable in any social system) becomes difficult or impossible." F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 470 (1966). Specifically, in this case, the
psychiatrist wished to treat Charters with Navane or Haldol; the Navane because he had
responded well to it in the past, the Haldol because it is available in long-action form and can
be administered on a biweekly or monthly basis. Charters, 863 F.2d at 302.
2. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

3. Id,
4. Charters,863 F.2d at 308-11.
5. E.g., United States v. Charters, No. 8300239-A, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("no
reported case with the precise facts of this case has been found by the court" Id.); See also
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1st Cir. 1982) and Project Release v. Prevost, 772 F.2d 979
(2d Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has stayed the en banc decision while deciding whether
to grant Charters certioraripetition. See 57 U.S.L.W. 3545 (1989). Additionally, while the
Charters Panel "express[ed] no views concerning the rights of convicted prisoners facing
forcible treatment with antipsychotic drugs," the Supreme Court has granted certiorarion this
question. See State v. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988), cert granted 57
U.S.L.W. 3388 (1989).
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I. FACTS

In late 1983, Michael Francis Charters was indicted for
making threats against President Reagan.' Specifically, he was
accused of saying that he bought the gun to kill the people
that he considered to be criminals, namely, President Reagan.7
A hearing was held on February 1, 1984 and the district
court found Charters incompetent to stand trial and committed
him to a federal facility.'
Charters' incompetence was
reviewed on five separate occasions, each time with the same
finding: Charters was found incompetent to stand trial. 9 He
was thus recommited to the federal facility each time. °
On numerous occasions the district court denied the
government's request to administer antipsychotic drugs to
Charters against his will.11 However, in May 1986, after
modifying its finding of incompetency to stand trial into a
finding that Charters was incompetent to make medical
decisions, the court granted the government permission to
forcibly medicate Charters.1 2 The district court found that the
state's duty to provide medical treatment outweighed the
detainee's (Charter's) interests in freedom of thought, liberty
and privacy. 3 This decision was appealed to the Fourth
Circuit which overruled the district court. 14 The Fourt Circuit
then reheard the case en banc and vacated the original
decision.1

6. Charters,
7. Charters,
8. Charters,
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id
15. United

829 F.2d at 482.
863 F.2d at 302.
829 F.2d at 482.

States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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BACKGROUND

There is unanimous agreement that a mentally ill and
incompetent pretrial detainee retains a qualified right to refuse
antipsychotic medications.16 This right stems from fundamental
constitutional guarantees contained in the first,17 fourth,18 fifth
and fourteenth 9 amendments, as well as the right of privacy.'
Having established these liberty interests, courts and
commentators diverge over a wide continuum of opinion as to
what procedural safeguards should to be triggered by a
patient's refusal to take prescribed antipsychotic medications.2
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, a number of
landmark cases involving the rights of civilly committed
mentally disabled patients to refuse medication were decided.22
These cases were decided with emphasis on the right to
freedom of thought, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the right to privacy.' They form
a clear analytic framework for decision-making in the civil
16. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. NJ. 1978), modified, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand 720 F.2d 266
(3d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650
(1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental
Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983), on remand 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984); see, e.g.,
Young, Treatment Refusal Among Forensic Inpatients, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
5 (1987).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Charters, 829 F.2d at 491.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Charters, 829 F.2d at 491.
19. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Charters,829 F.2d at 491.
20. Charters,829 F.2d at 490-92; see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy is concerned with the right of the
individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into fundamentally personal
matters).
21. E.g, Perlin, Does Competency MatterAfter United States v. Charters?, Paper presented
at University of Virginia's Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public Policy Twelfth Symposium
on Mental Health and the Law, Williamsburg, Virginia, 6 (March 1989) excerpted in 9
Developments in Mental Health (Jan.-June 1989) [hereinafter Does Competency Matter].
22. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. NJ. 1978); Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
23. Perlin, Fourth Amendment Right of Mentally Ill Defendants to Refuse Medication
Before Trial, 15 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 9 (1988) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment].

19891
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area. 24 However, these constitutional issues were seldom
discussed in analogous criminal cases and, when they were
addressed, the holdings did not produce a cogent doctrinal
direction. 2 Decisions were often in conflict with each other
and, when a clear thrust could be discerned, it was in conflict
with the decisions in the civil cases.26
A case which is illustrative of other civil cases in this
area is Mills v. Rogers,27 where the Supreme Court noted the
district court's holding that an involuntarily committed civil
patient's rights to liberty and privacy were implicated in the
decision of whether to allow forced medication with
antipsychotics to proceed. 2
These rights could only be
abrogated in an emergency situation in which "[f]ailure to
[medicate forcibly] would result in a substantial likelihood of
physical harm to that patient, other patients, or to staff
members of the institution."'
Otherwise, a court must find
the patient incompetent before medication can be forcibly
givenY
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's holding with regard to the constitutionally
protected interestsY The Court found that a state may not
rely on its parenspatriae power absent a "[d]etermination that
the individual to whom the drugs are to be administered lacks
the capacity to decide for himself whether he should take the
24.

d

25. Id at 9-10.
26. Id at 10 (citing State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978) and Craig v. State, 704
S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App. 1986) (upholding forced drugging to stimulate competence to stand
trial, where jury made aware of use of medication), with Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F.
Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 609 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.
1980) (due process violated where defendant rendered incompetent by overmedication)
(emphasis in original text)).
27. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
28. Id at 299 n.16 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
29. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 977 (1983) (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979)).
30. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1363-64 (D. Mass. 1979).
31. Project Release, 722 F.2d at 977 (citing Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st
Cir. 1980)).
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drugs."32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but remanded
the case for consideration in light of a decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, In re Guardianship
of Roe.33 The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he substantive
rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a
minimum [and] State law may recognize liberty interests more
extensive than those independently protected by the Federal
Constitution."' Thus, Rogers is crucial in at least two ways:
(1) it is illustrative of the way this type of case is handled in
civil context in that it secures the patient's qualified right to
refuse medication barring an emergency3" and in its clear
application of procedural due process rights to the decisonmaking process;' and (2) Supreme Court implied that state
courts might afford more generous protection in this area,37
increasing the importance of state courts.38
As noted, however, the resolution of this issue has been
far from clear in criminal cases.39 Professor Perlin notes that
there has been "aseries of apparently random decisions from
which almost no doctrinal threads could be extracted.""° One
case, for example, held that medication could be forcibly
administered if it would make the defendant competent to
stand trial and any prejudice resulting would be remedied by
a limiting instruction to the jury" while the court in another
case found that the defendant's due process rights were
32. See id at 978 (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971)), cet denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971)).
33. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
34. Project Release, 722 F.2d at 979 (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982)).
35. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979).
36. Id at 1371. See also Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. N.J. 1978)
(due process requires "some form of notice and an opportunity to be heard").
37. Does Competency Matter, supra note 21, at 4.
38. Id at 5. See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1986); see generally, Perlin, State Constitutionsand Statutes as Sources of Rightsfor the Mentally
Disabled, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1249 (1987).

39. Fourth Anendnent, supra note 23, at 9.
40. Id. at 10.
41. State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
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violated by his overmedication."
The panel decision in the Charters case moved the law
toward a more unified thinking in this troublesome area of
deciding under what circumstances and under whose discretion
a mentally ill person may refuse antipsychotic medication.43
It significantly strengthened a pretrial detainee's right to refuse
medication and revived the right to privacy and freedom of
thought rationales which underlay the law-reform civil cases
alluded to earlier."
In the process, the Charters panel distinguished
Youngberg v. Romeo4" and refused to apply its "professional
judgment" standard to the question of forced antipsychotic
medication.46 The panel relied on a thoughtful combined
standard for deciding whether a detainee/patient is medically
competent. to refuse medication47 and outlined a clear
procedure to be followed in the event that the detainee is
found incompetent."
Youngberg v. Romeo involved a profoundly retarded
man with the mental capacity of an eighteen-month-old child49
who had been involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania state
institution."0 He was injured on many occasions due to his
uncontrollable, violent behavior and was restrained in soft-arm
restraints.5 ' The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals' finding that he had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment"2 that
42. Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded

on other grounds, 609 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Fourth Amendment, supra note 23, at 9.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Charters, 829 F.2d at 488.
Id. at 494-97.
Id at 497-99.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 309-10.

51. Id. at 310. It was alleged that he suffered injuries at least 63 times (by his own
violence and others' reaction to him), and on one occasion received a broken arm. Id.
52. Id. at 312-13.
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must be balanced against the pertinent state interests
involved.53 In finding that Romeo's liberty interest was not
violated, the Supreme Court proceeded to state that "[t]here
certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better
qualified than appropriate professionals in making such
decisions, 5' 4 and "[flor these reasons, the decision, if made by
a professional, is presumptively valid . . .,,"
The
Youngberg decision has been read by
commentators as a clear message that these questions are
matters of state law and professional discretion. s6 Yet the
Fourth Circuit panel distinguished the Youngberg case in three
ways and proceeded to decide the case on the constitutional
issues.
First, the Charters court noted that Romeo the (plaintiff
in Youngberg) due to his severe handicap, was clearly unable
to be involved in decisions concerning his medical treatmant. s7
Thus, the issue in Youngberg became: how should decisions be
made for him? Citing Bee v. Greaves,58 the court noted that
Youngberg did not address the degree to which a competent
person may make treatment decisions on his own behalf.5 9
Although he was mentally ill, Charters might indeed have been
competent to participate in medical care decisions.'
The
61
court cited Davis v. Hubbard, in which the court noted that
"[T]here is no necessary relationship which renders [the
mentally ill] unable to provide informed consent to medical
53. Id. at 313.

54. Id. at 322.
55. Id. at 323.

56.

R. MILLER, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE

POST-REFORM EPA 143 (1987) [hereinafter MILLER]; Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp
1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); R.AkJ. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319
(W.D. Tex. 1984); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984).
57. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 488 (4th Cir. 1987).

58. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1214 (1985).
59. Charters, 829 F.2d at 488.

60. Id
61. 506 F. Supp 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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treatment. '62
Citing Bee v. Greaves,63 Rennie v. Klein, 4 and In re
Guardianship of Roe,6 5 the court found a second important
distinction.between the instant case and Youngberg: the nature
of the restraints.'
In Youngberg, the restraints were of a
temporary nature (soft-arm restraints) and there was no risk
of permanent harm to the plaintiff.6 . Citing the abovementioned cases, the court found the use of antipsychotic
medication to restrain Charters to entail the risk of "serious
and irreversible injury."'
Additionally, the court saw the
method involved as implicating Charters' freedom of thought
and compared it to psychosurgery.69 These findings made the
Charters decision one which "[m]ay profoundly impact an
interest at the core of liberty, the protection of the thought
that defines individuality, an interest which was not at stake in
Youngberg."7
The third rationale given by the court in
distinguishing Youngberg was that Romeo actually presented a
danger to himself and others on numerous occasions.71 The
deference to professional judgment involved a medical
determination of the best manner of avoiding violence.72 By
contrast, the court noted that in three years of confinement
73
Charters had not been involved in a single violent incident.
Again emphasizing the risk of permanent injury resulting from
antipsychotic medication, the court found that this is not a
62. Charters, 829 F.2d at 488 (quoting Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D.

Ohio 1980)).
63. 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 n.7 (10th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 499 U.S. 1214 (1985).
64. 720 F.2d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 1983) (Weis, J., concurring).
65. 383 Mass. 415, 436-37, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53 (1981).
66. Charters, 829 F.2d at 489.

67. Id
68. Id
69. Id
70. Charters, 829 F.2d at 489.

71. Id at 488.
72. Id at 489.
73. Id
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matter soley for professional judgement.74 The court found
that a doctor may not "dictate" treatment,75 he may only
advise. Further, the court found that an evaluation of the
benifits and risks must be an individualized decision and not
one made exclusively based on professional judgement.76
Having thus distinguished Youngberg, the Fourth Circuit
proceeded to balance Charters' interest in resisting the
medication against the government's interest in administering
it.
In its examination of the individual's interest, the court
found that "[f]orcible medication with antipsychotics implicates
individual rights to ...

freedom of thought as well as the right

to privacy protected by the Constitution and the common
law."" The common-law notions were discussed first in terms

of the right to be free from unwanted touching, dating back
to thirteenth-century England.78
The Supreme Court
acknowledged this right as far back as 1890, 79 and today it is

encompassed in the tort of battery. 0
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR TiHE
RIGHT

To

REFUSE TREATMENT

The Fourth Circuit panel opinion proceeded to find
"[t]he right to refuse medical treatment [to be] specifically
recognized as a subject of constitutional protection."'" In
support, it cited the already-mentioned "right to refuse" cases
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
(1985)).

Id.
Id
id at 490.
Id
Id (citing F.

MArrLAND, THE FORMS OF AcrnON AT COMMON LAW 40,

43, 53

79. Charters, 829 F.2d at 490-91 (citing Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 215

(1890)).
80. See id at 490 (citing W. KEATON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 39 (5th ed. 1984)).

81. See id at 491.
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from the civil context, 82 fourth 3 and first" amendment cases,
as well as the right to privacy cases.8 5
The court referred to a woman's constitutionally
protected right to obtain an abortion, which was upheld in
Roe v. Wade," as a primary example of the "[r]ight to privacy
contained in the notions of personal freedom which
underwrote the Bill of Rights."8 7
The idea that there is a constitutionally protected right
to privacy has been hinted at in Supreme Court decisions
since the 1890's, but had been without a strong constitutional
articulation 8 until, in Griswold v. Connecticut,9 Justice Douglas

located the right more precisely in the penumbras emanating
from several amendments which give the Bill of Rights "life

and substance."' These constitutionally guaranteed "zones of
privacy" were derived from the first, fourth, and fifth
amendments.91

Also mentioned was the ninth amendment

origin which implies that there is a natural rights aspect to the
92
right to privacy.
The 1960's (Griswold was decided in 1965) were a time

82. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653
(1st Cir. 1980).
83. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
84. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85.
Griswold
86.
87.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971);
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 (4th Cir. 1987).

88. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONsTrITTON: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 963 (1976) [hereinafter KELLY].
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id. at 484.
91. Id
92. See KELLY, supra note 88, at 964. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion,
placed emphasis on this aspect. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99. The ninth amendment was
seen as protecting rights not specifically noted in the first eight amendments. Id. at 488.
Thus, by implication, the rights of privacy in the marriage relationship were seen as
fundamental ones enjoyed by people at the time of the drafting and, therefore, protected.
See KELLY, supra note 88 at 963-64.
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in which the public definition of the private self was thought
to be repressive and in need of restructuring.93 There was a
notion that with the growth in the public sector of the
economy new "safeguards" were needed to protect the rights
of the individual.94 With the loosening of societal restrictions,
however, it is not surprising that a new phenomenon
developed whereby people began to complain of a loss of
identity or sense of self.9'
Against this backdrop began the advent of the patient's
rights movement which culminated in the "right to refuse"
cases of the late 1970's and early 1980's." However, while the
"political liberalism" of the 1960's was being altered in the late
1970's and 1980's, the "cultural radicalism" encompassing such
notions as sexual freedom was intricately woven into
mainstream American culture. 97 Thus, the same people who
participated in 1960's "revolution" were, in essence, becoming
more conservative.9" In this way, we should not be surprised
to see the social setting for a decline of interest in the right
of privacy issues which animated in the right to refuse cases. 99
FirstAmendment Aspects
The Charters panel placed special emphasis on the
freedon of thought (first amendment) aspects of the privacy
right."° Of particular concern to the court was the possibility
that antipsychotic medication may "undermine the foundation
93. 3. BENSmAN & R. LIUENFELD, BETWEEN PUBUC AND PRIVATE: Losr BOUNDARIES
OF THE SELF viii (1979) (hereinafter BENSMAN].
94. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through
a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv.60 (1976).
95. BENSMAN, supra note 93, at 5 n.12 (citing V. FRANKL, THE WILL To MEANING
(1969), IDENTITY AND ANXIETY (M. Stein, A. Vidich and D. White eds. 1960)).
96. See, e.g, MILLR, supra note 56, at 140.
97.

BENSMAN, supra note 93, at viii.

98.

Id

99.

See generally BENSMAN, supra note 93.
100. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 492 (4th Cir. 1987).
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1 ' The vision raised is one of totalitarian mind
of personality.""
control and the potential to allow the government to alter or
control thinking and thereby destroy the independence of
thought and speech so crucial to a free society."° This notion
appears to implicate one of the American citizen's most
cherished tenets, the freedom to express ideas. Certainly, if
people are to express ideas freely they must be able to
develop them freely.0 3 As noted in United Transportation
Worker's Union v. State Bar of Michigan,'14 a person's mental
processes and the generation of ideas come within the ambit
of the first amendment. The first amendment must equally
protect the individual's right to generate ideas. Or as Justice
Holmes stated in Abrams v. United States,105 "[w]e should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check expression of
opinion that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death
"106

However, there are those who question just what
freedom and what thought we are protecting in the psychotic
individual." 7 By definition, the schizophrenic's thought process
is plagued by disturbances involving the content and form of
thought, perception, affect, sense of self, voilition, and
relationship to the social and external world.0"
One
commentator has asserted that the entire notion that
antipsychotic drugs have a thought-controlling (in the sense of
changing the content of thought) potential is mistaken."° The
authors assert that courts tend to focus on the harmful effects
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id
Id

Id
401 U.S. 576 (1971).
105. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
106. Id at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
107. Gutheil & Applebaum, "Mind Control" "SyntheticSanity," "Artificial Competence,"
and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of AntiPsychotic Medication, 12 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 77 (1983) [hereinafter Gutheil].
108. DSM-III-R, supra note 1, at 459.
109. See Gutheil, supra note 107, at 81.
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of the drugs without adequately considering their positive
effects; 1 ' that is, to the extent that thought patterns are
changed, it is in the direction of normality."'
Courts,
additionally, fail to consider that the behavior effected is the
result of psychotic illness."' They posit that the courts believe
that medication has the capacity to suppress the belief-content
of thoughts, not merely the psychotic structure of thoughts."'
Medication can, however, be seen as increasing first
amendment rights as positive social interaction is often
improved."'

Perhaps at issue is the panel's lack of trust in our
society not to label as unhealthy that which is merely different.
As the social scientist Robert Endleman stated, "'[h]ealthy'
need not coincide with conformity to prevailing cultural norms
. . . and 'sick' need not coincide with non-conformity or
deviance.""' A large body of sociological literature has
developed expressing precisely this fear." 6 On the other hand,
when one sees the agony which psychosis causes its sufferer,
it becomes difficult to justify viewing symptoms as a
manifestation of privacy or freedom of thought. It is difficult
to see them as an expansion of the self in a meaningful way,
110. Id at 80.
111. Id

112. d
113. Id
114. See Spohn, Phenotiazine Effects on Psychological and Psychophysical Dysfunction
in Chronic Schizophrenics,34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 633 (1977). One can relate Justice
Holmes' concept of a "marketplace of ideas," see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and view psychotropic medication as a way of permitting the
individual to express himself in a manner consistent with permitting the individual to express
himself in a manner consistent with permiting the "free trade" of ideas. See supra note 1 for
a discussion of the way in which the psychotic process can make such communication
impossible.
115. R. ENDELMAN, PSYCHE AND SOCIETY 377 (1981). For an interesting discussion
of the role conformity and compliance play in the decision of whether to take medication,

see Amarasingham, Social and Cultural Perspective on Medication Refusal, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 353 (1980).
116. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); E.
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SoCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER

INMATES (1961); H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS 133-34 (1983); E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA (1963).
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but rather
one sees a "burden under which the individual must
7
suffer."

11

The final constitutional rationale for the right of privacy
implicitly stems from the fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures."' Citing Ingraham
v. Wright,119 the Charters court noted the right to be free from

"unjustified intrusion on personal security." "20 The court cited
Winston v. Lee,' and equated the surgical intrusion in Winston
to the unwanted injection of antipsychotic medication."2
In Rochin v. California,"2 the Supreme Court delineated
the standard for what constitutes an improper intrusion of the
body. Such an intrusion is improper if it (1) lacks in
procedural aspects; (2) contains needlessly severe procedures;
(3) is too novel; (4) or is lacking in a fair measure of
reciprocity. 2 4 One commentator has interpreted this standard
to mean, in part, that the question of physical pain must be
considered in addition to the permanence of possible
complications." 2 The reciprocity notion is seen as an attempt
to minimize the risk of an invasion being only for the good
of society; that is, the individual should reap some benefit as
well. 126 The Charters court, citing both legal and psychiatric
literature, was convinced that the potential dangers of
antipsychotic medications were substantial."2
Against the above-mentioned liberty interests, the court
2
considered the government's interest in forced medication. 1
117. See BENSMAN, supra note 93, at 68.
118. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
119. 430 U.S. 651 (1971).

120. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 n.18 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).

121. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
122. Charters,829 F.2d at 492.
123. 342 U.S. 165, 167 (1952).

124. Id
125.

See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITJTIONAL LAW 1333 (2d ed. 1988).

126. Id
127. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493 (4th Cir. 1987).
128. Id at 492.
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The government first asserted its interest in preventing
violence."n The court did not find this argument compelling as
Charters had not been involved in a single violent incident in
three years of incarceration." Although the district court had
found that he could not be maintained in a less restrictive
environment without medication,13 1 the Charters court of
appeals panel found that the risk of violence must be
"manifested," not merely hypothetical. 132 A number of studies
have indicated that psychiatrists have limited success in making
predictions about future violent behavior.133 A leading expert
has suggested that for predictions to be accurate they must be
"context-specific,"' not based on "attempts to guess, how
someone observed in a controlled environment will behave in
a very different setting."13' This belies the district court's
attempt to allow forced medication in the prison setting based
on predictions of future behavior in a hospital setting.
The second interest which the state asserted was in having
Charters medicated so that he might be competent to stand
trial."3 The court rejected this argument for three reasons.
First, it was not convinced that Charters would become
competent even if his medication were allowed. 37 Second,
they found that the government's interest should not be in
having a trial, per se, but in having a fair trial.1' The court
reasoned that a heavily medicated defendant may not receive
a fair trial for several reasons. Once made competent, the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 493.
131. Id
132. Id
133. See, e.g, Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions,
23 J.LEGAL EDuc. 24 (1970).
134. Monahan, Predictions Reasearch and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous
Mentally Ill Persons, 135 AM. 3. PSYCHtATRY 198, 199, 201 (1978).

135. Id.
136. Charters,829 F.2d at 492.

137. Id. at 493.
138. Id. See also Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 40 U. MIAMi L. REv. 1109
(1986).
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next legal issue for the incompetent detainee is typically the
insanity defense.139 However, if the defendant is heavily
medicated it could be difficult to convince a jury that he was
"insane" at the time the crime was committed.14 The court
was also concerned with other side effects of medication,
namely akinesia and akathisia. 1" Akinesia makes an individual
appear uncaring and unemotional; 42 akathisia causes
agitation. 43 The Fourth Circuit panel was concerned that
these manifestations could mislead the jury with regard to the
defendant's innocence, guilt, or attitude toward the crime or
victim.144 Finally, the court held that all of the abovementioned concerns, notwithstanding the state's interest in a
trial, "do not permit such a draconian invasion of the
individual's freedom and risk of permanent physical injury." 45
Third, the court rejected the state's previously
mentioned interest in protecting the health of its citizens by
stating that such an interest does not constitute a "license for
the government to control individual's lives."'"
The court
quoted Justice Brandeis' opinion in Olmstead v. United
States:47 "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficient."' " Additionally, the court noted, the well-being of
the citizen is best promoted by respecting his autonomy,
absent a finding of medical incompetence. 49
The court then addressed the question of the proper
139. Charters, 829 F.2d at 494.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id

146. Id at 494.

147. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
148. Charters, 829 F.2d at 494 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479

(1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
149. See id at 495.
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procedure for deciding if a person is medically competent.
The district court relied on the testimony of Charters'
psychiatrist that his refusal of medication was not in his best
interest.15 If the patient does not agree with the physician he
This, as the panel court said,
is deemed incompetent.'
renders the value of individual autonomy a nullity. 15 2 The
court noted that the question of how such a determination is
properly made had not arisen frequently in litigation. 53 The
appellate court instructed the district court to conclude
whether Charters followed a rational process in deciding to
refuse medication. 54 It warned that "rational" must be
'
For example, if Charters were to fear
construed "broadly."55
that medication would mean discharge to a less restrictive
environment or the risk of dangerous side effects, his thought
process would be deemed "rational" and his refusal upheld.156
A factor not considered by the court in this regard is
that certain types of paranoid psychotic individuals will always,
due to the very nature of their illness, be able to give cogent
explanations for their maladaptive actions, 157 while others, no
more disturbed but less organized, will not be able to do so."'
Are certain psychiatric diagnostic groups inherently more
competent than others? Perhaps preferable, is a test which
requires the person to rationally manipulate the abstract
information about his condition and apply it to his particular
situation. 59 This goes further toward ensuring a genuine
informed consent or refusal as it requires the patient to show
150.
151.
(1984).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
See Annas, Competence to Refuse Medical Treatment, 15 U. ToL L. REv. 561
Charters, 829 F.2d at 495; see generally Annas, supra note 151.
Charters, 829 F.2d at 497.
Id at 496.
Id
Id at 497.
See Annas, supra note 151, at 570.
Id
Id
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an understanding of the consequences of his action. 1 ' Such
an understanding is more important than it may appear
because many psychotic persons are unable to distinguish
clearly between themselves and others, reality and fantasy.'
Additionally, the panel dealt with the proper course of
action for decision making should the defendant be found
incompetent. 6 2 The discussion explored the various ways in
which decisions could be made for an incompetent person.
The court reiterated its rejection of the professional judgment
standard of Youngberg, 163 adding that the staff in institutional
settings often use medication for nontherapeutic reasons: to
164
control behavior and reduce cost.
65
The court discussed the substitute judgment approach,
a procedure that attempts to discern what the patient would
do were he competent, 166 and thus avoid the negation of
individual uniqueness implicit in applying a reasonable man
standard. 67 The court found that this approach, while
commendable, was in reality a legal fiction"6 as, according to
the court, it is not feasible for a judge to decide what a
mentally ill person would do were he competent. 169
Additionally, such a determination could be a subterfuge for
the imposition of the staffs will upon the patient.170 However,
the court did not reject this approach outright. Noting that in
cases where there is clear and convincing evidence as to what
a patient's wishes would be were he competent, those wishes
160. Id
161. See DSM-III-R, supra note 1, at 187-90; see also J. PERRY, ROOTS OF RENEWAL
IN MYrH AND MADNESS ix (1976).
162. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 497 (4th Cir. 1987).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id at 497.
Id
Id
Id
Id

168. Id at 498.

169. Id
170. Id
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should be respected." ' This is usually applicable in cases
where the patient has strong religious beliefs.172 The Charters
panel court held that absent "such clear and convincing
evidence," 3 the court should rely on the best interests of the
patient approach. 74 This was viewed as the best method of
protecting the patient's rights and was fully compatible with
government's parens patriae responsibilities.'75
The difficulty with this approach is that, to the extent
a determination of "best interest" is made based upon expert
psychiatric testimony, the process is brought "full circle" to a
reliance on professional judgment. However, the court
ameliorated this problem by stating that the decision must be
made by an "independent arbitrator."176 Thus, the court would
have the benefit of differing views within the profession upon
whose "judgment" it will rely. After such evidence the court
could approve an overall treatment plan subject to periodic
review. 77
Thus, the Fourt Circuit panel decided the case in a way
which could have been expected to play a central role in
pushing the law toward a greater emphasis on the rights of
confined mentally ill persons (both in hospitals and prisons) to
make autonomous medication-related decisions.
IV.

THE

EN"BANc

DECISION: THE PANEL DECISION IS
VACATED

In the en 'banc decision, 178 the Fourth Circuit vacated
the panel's decision in virtually every significant aspect. In an
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
IM
Id.
Id

175. Id
176. Id at 499.
177. 1& at n.28.
178. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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unispired application of the Matthews v. Eldridge179 balancing
approach, which fails to address a number of legal, factual,
and medical issues raised by the panel, the court ruled that
although Charters retained a constitutionally protected interest
in not being medicated against his will, this interest was only
to be protected against arbitrary and capricious actions by the
government.1 ° Due process was adequately guarded by the
possibility of judicial review of decisions made by medical
staff."'

Relying heavily on Youngberg and Parham v. J.R.,8 2 the
court dismissed the panel's approach for a variety of reasons.
The court viewed the procedure imposed as awkward, time
consuming, and expensive."3 Concern was expressed that the
treating psychiatrists would be reduced to mere expert
witnesses whose opinions would be weighed against those of
"outside expert witnesses whose testimony surely can be
anticipated." ' The court cited a number of unreported cases
in which inmate/patients who were situated similarly to
Charters stopped taking prescribed medication following to the
panel's decision." 5
In one of the cases the district court states: "[o]f prime
importance to the court in arriving at this decision [is whether
the inmate/patient in question] is competent to make this
179. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The test articulated in Matthews, a disability benefits case,
goes as follows:

[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitue
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative- burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requests would entail.

Id at 335.
180. Charters,863 F.2d at 308.

181. Id
182. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).

183. Charters, 863 F.2d at 309.
184. Id
185. Id at n.5.
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decision [to refuse medication]."1"
Although there was
testimony directly to the contrary, "the court [was] unable to
say that the opinion of [the other expert] outweighs the
opinion of Dr. Royal."1" 7 In a footnote, the court noted that

it is "difficult to imagine a situation in which the court could
18
ever give the testimony of one psychiatrist such weight.""
However, a close reading of the opinion suggests that if the
district court had read the Charters panel decision in a less
rigid manner, it could have ordered the medication if it
thought it necessary.8 9
With regard to the distinction between legal and
medical competence, the en banc court acknowledged that
there "may be a difference," but essentailly found that it was
too subtle and complex for a judge to fathom."' Thus, the
court denied Charters' assertion that a judicial hearing should
be held with regard to his competency, stating that judges are
not better able than medical personnel to make such
determinations.191

Similarly, the entire issue of the potential dangers of
antipsychotic medication was relegated to "one element" in the
"best interests" decision.1 92
It viewed differences of
professional opinion as to the probability and nature of
possible medication-related side effects as sufficient reason to
186. United States v. James Ballard, 704 F. Supp. 620, 624 (E.D.N.C. 1987).

187. Id
188. Id at 9 n.1.
189. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1987).
Latitude must be given in defining a 'rational reason'," supporting
Charters' decision. For example, it would not be a competent decision
based on rational reasons if Charters refused medication out of a denial
that he suffers from schizophrenia or out of a belief that the drugs will

have effects that no rational person could believe them to have.
Id. (emphasis added).
There was clear evidence in the district court case that Ballard (the person whom the
government wished to medicate against his will) actually stated as one of his reasons for
refusing medication that he did not believe that he is mentally ill." Ballard, 704 F. Supp. at

623.
190. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
191. Id
192. Id
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avoid judical attempts at synthesizing the scientific data on the
subject. 9 '
All of the above, including the perceived judicial
inability to comprehend these distinctions, was seen as further
reason to view medical staff decisions as "presumptively
valid."'94 The court then quotes former Chief Justice Burger
in Parham: "[c]ommon human experience and scholarly
opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary
proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical
decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and
emotional illness may well be more illusory than real."'195
Thus, the court deemed the government's plan for decision
making adequate. It relied heavily on its interpretation of the
Youngberg professional judgment standard. Importantly, this
was seen as standing for the proposition that the medical
decision in question need not be correct or most appropriate.
The only relevant inquiry now becomes "only whether the
."'9
decision was made by an appropriate professional ....

In

evaluating the decision we need only ask: "[W]as this decision
reached by a process so completely out of professional ...
boundaries ...

as to make it explicable only as an arbitrary,
197

nonprofessional one.
This was the essence of the en banc court's argument:
a inmate/patient, while retaining important liberty interests
193. Id. at 311-12.
Without exhaustive analysis of the scientific literature before us
documenting these side effects (of antipsychotic medications) and their
statistical probability, it suffices to observe that while there is universal
agreeement in the relevant professional discipline that the side effects
always exist as a risk, there is wide disagreement within those disciplines
as to the degree of their severity, their susceptibility to treatment, their
duration and, most significantly, their probability over the run of cases.
Id. at 310-11.
The court proceeded to hold that this means that it was "[p]ersuaded that the potential for
these specific side effects does not requrie substitution of the procedureal regime proposed
by Charters ....' Id
194. Id at 310.
195. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 640 (1979)).
196. See id at 313 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
197. See id
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concerning the decision of whether to take medication, may,
nonetheless, be forcibly medicated if the ultimate decision is
made by a professional.
Analysis
The Charters en banc decision addresses a number of
legal, medical, and ethical issues in a cursory fashion and fails
to address others entirely. These issues include: the informed
consent doctrine,19 the actual applicability of the Youngberg
and Parham authorities, 1 the related area of the risks and
benefits of psychotropic medication,' the proper use of the
balancing test,"' the related topic of what degree of
explanation is due a person being deprived of a liberty right, 2
and what burden the regime proposed by Charters really
entails for the government. 2°'
First, both 'the panel and en banc decisions failed to
adequately consider the doctrine of informed consent. At
common law a ,physician's showing that the patient had
consented to being touched was sufficient to override the
patient's complaint about the type of treatment received, and
the patient had no case for the tort of battery.'
However,
this developed into the requirement that the consent be
"informed."25 That is, the patient must be advised of the
value and risk of a proposed treatment.' While the Charters
court did not pay further attention to this aspect it might have
198. Charters, 863 F.2d at 304.
199. Id. at 305, 308.
200. Id. at 310-12.
201. Id. at 312.
202. Id. at 313.
203. Id. at 314.
204. Meisel, The Erpansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict
Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 56, 77-78 (1977).
205. P. Applebaum, Legal and Ethical Aspects of PsychopharmacologicPractice, in J.
Bernstein, CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 13-27 (2d ed. 1984).
206. l

at 14.
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been pivotal in this case. One must wonder what Charters'
pyschiatrist told him about his condition, the prescribed
medication and under what circumstances. An inadequate
exploration of this process could well undermine Charters'
genuine right to treatment and to informed consent. 27
The courts and commentators have outlined three main
aspects of informed consent: (1) the patient must have
adequate information so that he might make an infomed
choice;' 8 (2) his consent must not be coerced;' and (3) he
must be competent. 210 The question then becomes, what
should the patient be told? Generally, the consensus is, what
a reasonable patient would want to know and a reasonable
practioner would disclose.2
Common or very serious risks,
therefore, would be discussed.
Psychiatrists often rebel against these notions out of the
legitimate fear that mentally ill patients frequently misinterpret
the information provided.213 Schizophrenic patients (including
Charters) 214 often view mentioned risks as part of an evil plan
to harm them, and thus avoid needed treatment. 2 5' The only
satisfactory manner of balancing these concerns is for the
process to be tailored to the patient with careful monitoring
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
See, eg, Rose, Schizophrenia, Civil Liberties, and the Law, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL 1, 3 (1988); see also B. SHULMAN, ESSAYS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA (2d ed. 1984) ("[t]he
consequent loss of consensual frame of reference and need to replace it with a private logic
[and] the distrust of others and their logic, and the assignation of private and secret meanings
to ordinary events are typical reactions of schizophrenics to attempts to impart information."
Id.).
214. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 304 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). A number
of studies document the connection between the paranoid ideas often associated with
schizophrenia and medication refusal. See, e.g, Wilson & Enoch, Estimation of Drug Rejection
by the Schizophrenic Patient, 1 BRrr. MED. J.972 (1962).
215. Applebaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and
ClinicalReality in Drug Refusal by PsychiatricPatient, 7 AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE
L. 306, 310 (1976).
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of his reaction by the psychiatrist. 16 Thus, informed consent
should be a thoughtful part of the treatment process itself,
and the patient's understanding should be explained by the
psychiatrist so that misinterpretations and unrealistic fears can
be addressed.217 This process is also important in building
trust between the therapist and patient as a result of the fact
that patients are increasingly likely to hear about the risks of
medication from others and would mistrust the psychiatrist
should he not be the one to impart such important
information.21
A willingness on the part of the patient to be treated
is also crucial, particularly in an institutional setting such as a
prison or psychiatric hospital.219 There is an inherently
coercive aspect to these institutions where the person is
dependent on the authorities for the most basic necessities.
On a more subtle level, the patient may fear withdrawal of
the psychiatrist's interest should he refuse medication.22
These factors should lead to a careful investigation of the
subtleties in this type of case. The inquiry must: (1) ensure
that the right to informed consent is not abridged in an overt
or covert manner,21 and (2) ensure that facial compliance by
way of, for example, a signed statement, is not achieved in a
manner which unfairly frightens and confuses the patient, thus
robbing him of an equally important right to treatment. 222
These issues are not adequately addressed in either the panel
or en banc decisions.
216. See Applebaum, supra note 205, at 24.
217. Id at 25.
218. Munetz & Schultz, Minimization and Overreaction to Tardive Dyskinesia, 12
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 168, 169 (1986).
219. See Applebaum, supra note 205, at 17-18.

220. Id. at 18.
221. Id. at 13-27.
222. Rogers & Centifanti, Madness, Myths, and Reality, 14 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 7, 8
(1988).
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The en banc court rested squarely on Youngberg to
support its use of the professional judgment standard.m Yet
it did not address the panel's detailed attempt to distinguish
that case on the facts. 4 First, the panel noted the difference
between the plaintiff in Youngberg and Charters (discussed
above).' Charters clearly had a different type of impairment
and a much higher intelligence level. 6 Indeed, Dr. Sally
Johnson, the treating psychiatrist in Charters, thought Charters
was quite bright.'
This difference, with its important
ramifications, goes unnoted in the en banc opinion. Second,
the panel noted that the Youngberg plaintiff (Romeo) had
been violent on numerous occasions where Charters had not.'
Charters was found to be, at most, verbally agressive. 2 9 This,
too, is not mentioned in the en banc opinion. Third, the
panel relied heavily on its distinction between antipsychotic
medications in Charters' case (which it saw as akin to
psychosurgery) and the use of temporary, soft-arm restraints
on Romeo.2 ° While there clearly is room for disagreement as
to the proper interpretation of these medical aspects, the en
banc court refused to engage in any discussion of these issues.
For example, the en banc court could have pointed to
the unwarranted analogy between psychosurgery and
psychotropics. Psychosurgery is an irreversible procedure
which is rarely used." At least one reading of the scientific
data points to the view that medication is less intrusive and
223. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

224. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 487-90 (4th Cir. 1987).
225. Charters, 829 F.2d at 488-90.
226. Id. at 489-90.

227. Id. at 480.
228. Id at 489.

229. Id at 480.
230. Id at 489.

231. See Shevitz, Psychosurgey: Some Current Observation, 133 AM. J. PSYCHtATRY 266
(1976); Donnelly, The Incidence of Psychosurgery in the Untied States, 1971-73, 135 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1476 (1978).
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often of great benefit to the patient. 2 Second, the panel's
preference for restraints could have been challenged in a
number of ways. While psychotropics do have side effects
and dangers, 233 they can reduce the symptoms that make
restraints necessary and, if properly used, afford a patient the
possibility of leading a productive life.'
Restraints, in
contrast, are only utilized to temporarily control an out-ofcontrol patient? 53 As stated by the American Psychiatric
Association, "[t]o the extent that there is a difference between
medication and restraints, it lies fundamentally in the fact that,
while restraints are merely ancillary to treatment goals, the
medications are themselves therapeutic."'
But the en banc
court did not make such an argument; instead, it ignored the
issue.
The en banc court cited Parham numerous times in
support of its ruling that less rigorous due process hearings
would be sufficient to protect Charters' liberty interests. As
noted by one commentator, however; "Parhamdealt with the
commitment of juveniles, and its holdings were premised on
a very specific vision of the way parents, allegedly, make
certain medical decisions for their children with their
232. See, eg, Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133, 142

(1987) ("Antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs remain the primary modality in the treatment of
an acute episode or an acute exacerbation of this schizophrenic illness. The efficacy of
medication in this context has been established in numerous double-blind, placebo-controlled
trials." Id. at 134.). This is not to say that there are not other factors to consider in the
therapeutic decision of whether to medicate, aside from the possible side effects. For
example, many schizophrenics who improve on antipsychotics continue to have serious
symptoms. Csernamsky, Kaplan & Hooister, Problems in Classification of Schizophrenics as
Neuroleptic Responders and Nonresponders,173 Am.J.PSYCHIATRY 1237-45 (1976). The point
of this section is not to resolve the difficult question of which patient should be offered

medication, but rather to draw attention to the fact that the en banc court did not address
most of the relevant considerations in a serious fashion.
233. Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Right To Refuse
PsychotropicDrugs, 6 J.OF LEGAL MED. 107, 111-12 (1985). Common temporary side effects
include fatigue, excitability, muscle spasms, hallucinations, parkinsonism, allergic reactions and
potentially permanent tardive dyskinesia.
234. Id. at 111.
235. See Berger, Medical Treatment of Mental Illness, 200 SCIENCE 974 (1978).

236. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n at 11-12, United States
v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (No. 86-5568).
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offsprings' best interest at heart." 7 It is thus implicitly
asserted by the en banc court that the medical staff where
Charters was incarcerated would protect his interests in the
same manner as would a parent. Surely, the parens patriae
argument, despite its allusion to "parents," does not assure this
degree of concern.
The deficiencies of psychiatric, staff and their
concomitant overreliance on medication for control purposes
or administrative ease is well documented.'
The court
formed a strong foundation for the reasoning of Judge
Murnaghan's panel decision 2 9 and his dissent from the en
banc decision.24 In many large, public psychiatric hospitals
drugs are the only actual treatment provided.241 Often the
staff is not adequately trained or the facility is understaffed. 42
In many facilities, American-trained staff and staff members
from minority groups are severely lacking. These problems
have been documented in a number of federal cases.243 Judge
Murnaghan's fear that the staff in these institutions may have
conflicts of interest when making medication decisions was not
unfounded when expressed but went unconsidered by the en
banc court.
The en banc court explicitly employed a balancing test
as the framework for its decision.244 As a general proposition,
balancing has been seen as having a variety of virtues; it is
237. See Does Competency Matter, supra note 21, at 27.
238. See, e.g, Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Guardianship of
Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); see also Brooks, The ConstitutionalRight to
Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 2 BULL. Am. AC AD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 179, 188 (1980).
239. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 499 (4th Cir. 1987).
240. Charters,863 F.2d at 313 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).

241. See Rogers & Centifanti, supra note 222, at 7.

242. Id
243. See, eg., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40

(1981).
244. Charters, 863 F.2d at 306-07.
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simple, descriptive, and just.24
The balancing test has been criticized, however, as
endangering "the central values" of our democratic system.246
According to this argument, the test comes to dominate the
protections it is meant to guard. 247 Laurent Frantz has said,
in the first amendment context, that "[t]he balancing test
assures us little, if any, more freedom of speech than we
should have had if the first amendment had never been
adopted. 248
Whatever the test's virtues or problems may be in the
abstract, attention to certain matters are essential for its
appropriate and fair application. These have been outlined
by Judge Coffin of the First Circuit Court of Appeals as
follows: (1) the court should indicate the thought processes of
250
the writer.249 This will reduce the "effect of subjective bias";
(2) carefulness must be used in reasoning. 215 This includes a
continuing alertness "to the temptation to rely on facile
assumptions";25 2 (3) it is important to develop a strong factual
base for the decision;E53 (4) the court must inquire not only as
to the individual's right at stake, but, also evaluate "its
centrality and importance";254 and (5) in upholding the
government's asserted interests the court must "[a]void relying
on an official's casual and self-serving protestation without
imposing a burdensome evidentiary obligation."" The Fourth
Circuit did not fully meet these standards for a just application
245. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C.L. REV. 585, 622, 625, 634 (1988).
246. Id at 636.

247. Id
248. I
249. Coffin, JudicialBalancing The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16, 22
(1988).

250. Id. at 23.
251. Id
252. Id at 23-24.
253. Id.at 23.

254. Id
255. Id at 24.
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of the balancing test. It did not explore a number of key
issues which would have allowed it to do so.
First, the court's analysis leads to a test virtually
impossible to overcome should the patient wish to refuse
medication: How could a plaintiff prove that the decision to
medicate was completely arbitrary and unprofessional? Short
of extreme and malicious malpractice, it is hard to imagine
proof which would meet such a burden. Second, while the
court acknowledges, almost in passing, Charters' constitutional
rights inplicated by the medication question,56 it declines to
employ a standard which adequately safeguards them. As the
court noted, due process is "[filexible and calls for such
procedural and protections as the particular situation
demands." s7 As remarked by Professor Rabin, there should
be a layered approach to due process. 25' Depending on the
importance of the right implicated, there could be a need for
protection ranging from the right to confront adverse witnesses
to a fully adversarial hearing. 9 He goes on to say that if, for
example, the first amendment is at issue, balancing between
the individual's value and society's cost weight in favor of full
hearing."' 6 The Fourth Circuit denies the members of the bar
and the particular plaintiff a reasoned explanation of why the
fundamental rights implicated in the Charters case did not
demand such a full hearing.
An exploration of the issue of risks and benefits of
medication, crucial to a reasoned balancing of Charters' rights
as against those of the state, is also lacking. Certainly, this is
256. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
257. Id. at 306 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 581 (1972)).
258. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through
a Reasons Requirement, 44. U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 79 (1976).

259. Id. at 79.
260. Id The court, in its technical application of the balancing test, is making a tacit

judgment of the importance of the rights implicated; that is, by giving them cursory treatment,
the value judgment is made clear. The values, however, are not articulated. Such a
mechanical application is criticized in Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory
of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
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a complex matter. Important to a fair understanding of the
issue is "[a] need for a rational acceptance of two facts:
Neuroleptics [antipsychotics] are very helpful when used
properly, and tardive dyskinesia is a genuine problem with
26 One difficulty in assessing
long-term neuroleptic treatment.""
the usefulness of the medication is that these drugs were first
seen as offering a risk-free panacea for the treatment of
psychosis;2 2 then, as risks became evident, there was a
counter-reaction which perhaps overemphasized their potential
for harm.263
The psychiatric literature has often remarked on the
positive aspects of the medications, noting various studies
showing that patients suffering from schizophrenia who when
treated with medication, did significantly better than those
offered only verbal psychotherapy. 2' They remind us that
many patients currently treated with these medications were
often incarcerated for long periods of time in hospitals, and
now with medication, these same patients can lead more
integrated lives in the community. 265 Furthermore, it is noted
that there is no alternative treatment. 266 However,
psychotropics can cause serious side effects.26 7 No medication
is risk free in this regard.26' The prevalence of side effects is
from 24% to 56% of long-term antipsychotic users.269
Predictions cannot be made as to the particular effect of a
261. Munetz & Schultz, supra note 218 at 168 (quoting D. JESrE & R. WYA'rr,
UNDERSTANDING AND TESTING TARDIVE DYSKINESIA 9 (1982)).

262. See Munetz & Schultz, supra note 218, at 168.
263. Id
264. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 2272.
265. See, e.g, Klerman, National Trends in Hospitalization, 30 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 110, 111-12 (1979); Applebaum & Gutheil, supra note 215 at 306 (1976); Brooks,
supra note 238, at 182-83; see also Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry, 132
AM. . PSYCHIATRY 1237 (1975).
266. See Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 236, at 12.
267. See J. BERNSTEIN, CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 168 (2d ed. 1984).

268. Id
269. Id at 165.
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medication on a patient without a clinical trial.'o A typical
symptom that the average patient suffers from (tardive
dyskinesia) involves abnormal mouth and body movements;
this is often accompanied by excessive drooling. 271 All
movement can be affected in the more extreme conditions. 2
273
There have been cases reported following short-term use,

4
but they are rare.27
The counter-arguments to the above-mentioned data,
aside from citing the general efficacy of these medications in
treating psychosis, include the assertion that lowering dosages
or stopping treatment can usually control most side effectsY 5
Additionally there are studies which indicate that most patients
who are afflicted with tardive dyskinesia have mild
symptoms. 6 All of this provides support for an argument in

favor of an acceptable cost/risk ratio.

7

270. Id
271. Kemna, supra note 233.
272. Appleton, Fourth Psychoactive Drug Usage Guide, 43 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12
(1982).
273. See, Bernstein, supra note 267, at 170.
274. Id However, many potentially serious conditions go unreported due to confusion
in diagnosis. See, e.g., Ananth & Edelmath, Meige's Syndrome Associated with Neuroleptic
Treatment, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 513 (1983), in which a serious condition (Meige's
syndrome) is reported as being confused with tardive dyskinesia. Id. In a recent study, three
physicians concluded that neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which can be fatal, may be more
common than is thought. Popoe & Keck, Neuroleptic Malignant S)ndrome in a Large
Psychiatric Hospital, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1227 (1986). Clinicians also often confuse
another side effect, akanthisia, with tardive dykinesia due to their failure to question patients
about their subjective feelings of distress. Munetz & Comes, DistinguishingAkathisia and
Tardive Dyskinesia: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 343
(1983). An additional cause for alarm is that the incidence of certain side effects seems to
be rising. See, e.g., Juste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dykinesia:An Overview,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 177 (1980). There are also reports of increasing prevalence of
medication-induced catatonia.
Fricchione, Cassem, Hoberman & Hobson, Intravenous
Lorasepam in Neuroleptic-InducedCatatonia,3 J. CLINICAL PSCHOPHARMACOLOGY 338 (1983);
Ayd, Neuroleptic-InducedCatatonia:A FurtherReport, 18 INr'L DRUG THERAPY NEws 9 (1983).
275. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 18: TARDIVE DYSKINESIA 123,

145 (1980).
276. See Applebaum & Gutheil, supra note 215, at 309.
277. id
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All of the above may indeed fundamentally be part of
the "best interest" analysis as the en banc court asserts, 278 but
the real question is: Who is given the authority to decide what
is in a particular patient's best interest at any given time? The
en banc court would strip an individual of his right to decide
and place it in the hands of the treating doctor, ignoring
Justice Cardozo's statement in Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital"9 that "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body ....280

Furthermore, a less mechanical reading of the balancing
test would have considered all of the components as a whole,
not compartmentalized each section as if it had no relation to
the other. It must be noted that, even taking all of the
suggested benefits of medication at face value, it is never
asserted that they are properly administered to patients who
are not receiving adequate care in all other aspects. of their
treatment. They are not a substitute for verbal psychotherapy
or medical monitoring, but merely a major element of good
treatment. 281 Seen in this light, one must ask how a decision
to give forced medication will affect a patient who might very
well be receiving substandard care in other regards. 2 This
issue was not addressed by the en banc court.
In evaluating the government interest side of the
equation, the Fourth Circuit could have considered data with
regard to the actual cost burden of judicial hearings. Studies
on how many patients actually refuse medication and the
context and consequences of such refusals could have been
considered.
As noted in the panel opinion a very small number of
patients utilize due process procedures when they are in
278. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
279. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
280. Id at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.

281. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 2272.
282. Id
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place. 3 Additionally, even after court rulings finding a right
to refuse medication, relatively few patients in these
jurisdictions decide to so refuse.'
Following the Rennie decision, the psychiatric
community feared massive medication refusals, but this has not
occurred. This fear overshadowed, at least in some psychiatric
circles, the positive aspects of allowing refusal: the increase in
a patient's self-esteem, and the strengthening of the doctorpatient therapeutic alliance that is so necessary to proper
treatment. In short, the en banc court did not avail itself of
the data which would have allowed it to look beyond the selfserving assertions of the government's personnel.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may safely be said that the Charters
case clearly illustrates two divergent manners of approaching
the question of patient autonomy with regard to the right to
refuse antipsychotic medications. The panel decision is a clear
example of a case in which the court gave thoughtful attention
to detail and made appropriate use of the balancing test, while
the en banc decision is illustrative of the way in which the
balancing test can be used to circumvent a consideration of
the scientific data presented by this type of situation. One
cannot say, however, that the en banc decision will not
become an example of the way that a majority of these cases
are approached.
Just as the 1960's set the social tone for an increased
interest in the liberty and privacy rights of the individual, s5 the
283. Id. See also Brooks, supra note 238, at 179, 188, 206.
284. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 499 n.28 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Brushwood
& Fink, Right to Refuse Treatment with Antsychotic Drugs, 42 AM. J. HosP. PHARMACY 2709
(1985)).
285. See, e.g., Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4 (1964).
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conservative backlash of the 1980's' has set the stage for a
withdrawal of the courts from a vigorous enforement of such
rights. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the section
of the court's decision which emphasized the cost of hearings.
American society in the 1980's, in general, has reacted to the
gains of racial minorities and other groups empowered during
the 1960's and 1970's by removing the financial support which
made such gains possible. 7 As the Supreme Court becomes
more clearly a court in keeping with the majoritarian attitudes
of the current political climate,' there is no reason to believe
that the lower federal courts will not continue their withdrawal
in this and other important areas of protection. In this small
part of the overall picture the original panel decision in
Charters may be seen as the last stand of a federal judicial
element still concerned with individual liberties to the extent
that it was willing to engage in a difficult, thoughtful analysis
in an area that makes many judges uncomfortable. 289
Henry A. Dlugacz
286. J. BENSMAN & A. VIDICH, AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE WELFARE STATE AND
BEYOND 231 (1987).

287. Id. at 165.
Ultimately the money [to support social programs] is understood [by the
middle class] to come from the taxes of the affluent white middle and

upper classes. At this point, white middle-class liberalism becomes

Ia.

expensive and produces the most dangerous form of racism, a racism
which is not expressed by conscious racial attitudes but by budgetary and
fiscal selfishness and conservatism which prevent manifest solutions to
racial problems.
288. See Does Competency Matter, supra note 21, at 41.

289. Id. at 34 (quoting Judge Bazelon):
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists,
aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or marine bioligists. For some
reason, however, many people seem to accept judicial scrutiney of, say,
the effect of a proposed dam on fish life, while they reject a similiar
scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric treatment on human lives .... It can

hardly be that we are more concerned for the salmon than the
schizophrenic.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743 (1969).

